Living Institutions: Sharing and Sanctioning Water among Pastoralists in Namibia  by Schnegg, Michael & Linke, Theresa
World Development Vol. 68, pp. 205–214, 2015
0305-750X/ 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd.
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).www.elsevier.com/locate/worlddev
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2014.11.024Living Institutions: Sharing and Sanctioning Water among Pastoralists
in NamibiaMICHAEL SCHNEGG and THERESA LINKE*
Universita¨t Hamburg, GermanySummary. — Sanctions are often considered an important component of successful resource management. To govern water usage,
pastoral communities in Namibia have speciﬁc sanctions at their disposal and yet these are almost never applied. Interestingly, this does
not lead to a breakdown in water supply. To understand collective action in small communities it is important to take into account that
people share multiple resources. Combining ethnography and network analysis we reveal that people cannot separate the sharing of
water from the sharing of ancestries, food, and work. This discourages the application of formal sanctions while opening other means
of maintaining institutional regimes.
2014TheAuthors.PublishedbyElsevierLtd.This is an open access article under theCCBY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
Key words — water management, Namibia, institutions, social networks, sanctions, sharing*The results presented in this article are the product of an ongoing rese-
arch project directed by the ﬁrst author and Michael Bollig (University of
Cologne). Kathrin Gradt, Thekla Kelbert, Diego Menestrey and the sec-
ond author are employed in the project and carried out ethnographic ﬁeld
work. All project members provided valuable ideas and comments, which
are partly incorporated here. Our research would not have been possible
without the support, information, and encouragement of many people
living in the communities we study. Julia Pauli, Lena Borlinghaus, Edward
Lowe, Richard Kiaka, and Elsemi Olwage have oﬀered critical and very
constructive comments to an earlier draft of this manuscript. Martin
Dallek constructed the database and manages the data. The Deutsche
Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) funds the research since 2010 (SCHN
1103/2/1+2, BO 1123/16). We are indebted to all of them. Final revision
accepted: November 28, 2014.1. INTRODUCTION
Alfons is a respected, elderly man who owns more cattle
than anyone else in Elandsput, a pastoral community in north-
western Namibia. 1 One day, when we 2 passed through the
community and stopped at Justus’s house, he – the chairper-
son of the water committee – complained about his uncle
Alfons. Again, his uncle had refused to pay the contributions
each of them has to give to buy the diesel that is needed to
pump the groundwater for their livestock. At the same time,
his animals drank the largest share. We asked whether he
had recently approached Alfons. He replied that he had, and
that we would not believe what his uncle had told him. He
said: “I never told my cattle to come to drink at that water
point. How can you make me responsible for their behavior,
and even ask me to pay for them?” Asked whether they had
thought about applying the graduated sanctions the commu-
nity had agreed upon (e.g., paying a ﬁne) Justus replied:
“No, we cannot do that.” This article explores the reasons
why. In doing so we examine how the sharing of water is
embedded in other social forms and how this can prevent,
adjust, and substitute the application of speciﬁc enforcement
rules. 3
In his classic theory of “The Tragedy of the Commons,”
Hardin (1968) had situations like the above in mind when he
argued that the incentives for an individual to contribute to
a common good are low, since s/he proﬁts from the beneﬁts
no matter whether or not s/he contributed himself/herself.
Alfons’ cattle will drink, regardless of whether he contributes
to the diesel fuel fund or not. And consequently, “Freedom in
a commons brings ruin to all” (Hardin, 1968, p. 1244). Four
decades of research have largely debunked Hardin’s assump-
tions and have shown (1) that freedom does not necessarily
lead to collapse (Moritz, Scholte, Hamilton, & Kari, 2013)
and (2) that many communities have developed institutions
to govern resources successfully over long periods of time
(Acheson, 2011; Agrawal, 2001; Araral, 2009, 2013; Dolsak
& Ostrom, 2003; Ostrom, 1990; Ostrom et al., 2002; Ratner,
Meinzen-Dick, May, & Haglund, 2013; Ruttan, 2006).
In her pioneering work Elinor Ostrom identiﬁed eight
principles that explain failure and success in shared resource205management. And, although recent research assumes that
more than eight variables are necessary for a complete expla-
nation (Agrawal, 2002, 2003; Araral, 2009; Poteete, Janssen, &
Ostrom, 2010), two of the original eight – graduated sanction-
ing, and monitoring (principles 4 and 5) – play a crucial role in
practically all approaches (Anderies, Janssen, & Ostrom, 2004;
Araral, 2011; Cox, Arnold, & Villamayor Toma´s, 2010;
Gibson, Williams, & Ostrom, 2005; Janssen, 2013; Janssen &
Ostrom, 2014; Ostrom, Stern, & Dietz, 2003). Ostrom summa-
rizes that institutions are sustainable if “appropriators who
violate operational rules are likely to be assessed graduated
sanctions” (1990, p. 90). Ostrom also points out that monitor-
ing and sanctioning involve costs and become public goods
themselves, which need to be maintained (1990, p. 43 f).
Fairly recent cross-cultural experiments have shown that
people are often willing to pay these costs (Henrich et al.,
2006). While some view evolutionary processes as the cause
(Henrich et al., 2006), others have pointed out that sanctioning
provides an information feedback loop in the social-ecological
system that prevents its collapse (Anderies et al., 2004).
Although sanctioning behavior is common practice, its likeli-
hood varies between contexts and with the costs involved.
The enforcement of rules is easier in groups with shared norms
and a certain level of trust, while it is especially diﬃcult in foot-
loose populations; e.g., when actors have many exit options
206 WORLD DEVELOPMENT(Araral, 2009, p. 691, 694, 695). At the same, when costs are
low, sanctioning is more likely and vice versa (Anderson &
Putterman, 2006, p. 11; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004, p. 189).
In Elandsputs and other face-to-face communities in north-
western Namibia, speciﬁc sanctions for breaking the rules of
water management exist, yet they are almost never applied.
At the same time, this does not result in a breakdown of water
supply and the institutional regime. Against this background
we ask: (1) Why speciﬁc sanctions are not applied, and (2)
whether and how other forms of social control substitute
speciﬁc sanctions to allow the governing of water usage suc-
cessfully? We argue that social networks and the sharing of
multiple resources, experiences, and spaces play a salient role
in understanding both phenomena.2. PASTORALISM AND SOCIAL NETWORKS
Many ethnographies have highlighted that among African
pastoralists social networks play a key role in the sharing of
land and water in a highly stochastic ecological environment
(Behnke, Scoones, & Kerven, 1993; Bollig, 2006; Dyson-
Hudson & Dyson-Hudson, 1980; McCabe, 2004). Social rela-
tions grant access to grazing and open emergency routes when
the rains fail to come (Bollig, 2006; Gluckman, 1966, p. 5;
McCabe, 1990, 2004; Moritz et al., 2013). While pastures were
long held communally by kin-based groups, recent develop-
ments including privatization, migration, decentralization
and conservation have led to more fragmented, pluralistic
and conﬂict-laden governance regimes (Benjamin, 2008;
Fratkin, 1997; Galvin, 2009; Haro, Doyo, & McPeak, 2005;
Lesorogol, 2005; Schnegg, Pauli, & Greiner, 2013).
Until some 50 years ago, most pastoralists obtained water
through natural springs, surface water, and hand-dug wells
(Bollig, 2013; McCabe, 2004; Robinson, 2009). Again, social
relationships are salient to securing access. The Nuer, for
example, congregate during part of the year around dry-sea-
son homes where water is available in dried-up riverbeds.
On their way to these seasonal residences, they have to move
their cattle through the territories of other groups. Under
these constraints, it is essentially necessary for them to
maintain friendly terms with neighboring groups (Evans-
Pritchard, 1940, 1951; Gluckman, 1966, pp. 5–6).
Since the middle of the 20th century, throughout Africa
hundreds of boreholes have been drilled to make pastures
available that were only rarely usable in the past. Permanent
boreholes reduced the need for migration, and mobility
decreased (Bollig, 2013; Picardi & Seifert, 1976; Sobania,
1988). In Namibia, the infrastructure to pump, store, and dis-
tribute water was maintained by the South West Africa admin-
istration under the jurisdiction of the colonial South African
state. After independence, the Namibian state handed the
responsibility of these boreholes over to local user association
governments (Bollig & Menestrey Schwieger, 2014; Falk,
Bock, & Kirk, 2009). Since then, local communities had to
cover the costs of water and the administrative responsibility
for its distribution. Through this process, water, like land,
became a common-pool resource that had to be managed at
the community level. It is subtractive (e.g., water consumed
by one farmer reduces the amount of water available for oth-
ers) while at the same time it is hard to exclude anyone from
using it. 4 In Namibia, with the localization of water manage-
ment, the role of networks changed. While social networks
guaranteed access to distant resources in the past, they have
now become salient for sharing a common good at home.3. SOCIAL NETWORKS AND INSTITUTIONS
Common-pool resource theory typically considers shared
norms, trust, communication, and information as beneﬁcial
for collective action (Janssen, 2013; Janssen & Ostrom, 2014;
Poteete et al., 2010, p. 227). In turn, it is generally assumed
that these properties go hand in hand with small, socially dense
connected groups (Araral, 2009; Beitl, 2014; Olsson, Folke, &
Berkes, 2004; Ostrom, 2005; Pretty, 2003; Pretty & Smith,
2004; Pretty & Ward, 2001).
Early on, Ostrom argued that if people interact intensely
they can (1) control or obtain information about the actions
of others and (2) are also likely to “develop strong norms of
acceptable behavior and to convey their mutual expectations
to one another in many reinforcing encounters” (Ostrom,
1990, p. 206). Strong norms, again, facilitate collective action
as they make social behavior more predictable (Lesorogol,
2005; Moritz et al., 2013; Poteete et al., 2010). 5 In relation
to information, Janssen further elaborated that the visibility
of actions does not necessary lead to better performance.
However, in combination with communication it does. Com-
munication, typically more intense in small, dense, and con-
nected networks, allows participants to make commitments
to cooperation, which in turn can be monitored by gaining suf-
ﬁcient information on the actions of others (Janssen, 2013;
Janssen & Ostrom, 2014).
Beyond social cohesion, some authors have pointed out that
a certain level of leadership and heterogeneity can be beneﬁ-
cial, as long as the leaders are integrated into the group and
trusted (Kurian & Dietz, 2013, p. 1533). Sandstro¨m and
Rova (2010) found that communities which are both densely
knit and centrally integrated do better in managing resources.
Heterogeneity is theorized to be supportive, because it inte-
grates diﬀerent social actors and provides – in the sense of
bridging social capital – linkages to diﬀerent contexts and
resources (Sandstro¨m & Rova, 2010).
While social cohesion and dense networks are usually
regarded as supportive for institutional performance, a few
studies indicate that these links may be less clear. Most impor-
tantly, Bodin and Crona (2008) ﬁnd that high levels of social
capital (measured by network density and connectivity, among
other variables) do not always predict sustainable resource
management practices. In this study, although networks were
dense and connected, the willingness to report rule-breaking
was low (2008, p. 2774). The authors propose that this might
have to do with the social costs involved for those about to
report (2008, p. 2776) and/or with norms and patterns of
behavior which oppose the reporting of rule-breaking (2008,
p. 2775). At the same time, they do not present qualitative
data to establish this causal relationship in detail. In the same
vein, Langfred (2004) and Horne (2001) show experimentally
that trust induces reluctance to monitor and to sanction in
highly cohesive groups.
In this article we argue that we need to understand the qual-
ity and the interpersonal dynamics of social relationships in
much greater detail to grasp the complex interrelationship
between sanctioning, social networks and the functioning of
institutional regimes. This includes looking beyond density
and cohesion of social conﬁgurations. To explore the
properties of social ties we draw on the concept of multiplex-
ity, developed in the 1950s by the anthropologist Max
Gluckman (Gluckman, 1955, p. 19). A relationship is multiplex
if it encompasses many dimensions, including economic, procre-
ative, political, religious, and educational (Gluckman, 1955,
p. 19). Gluckman argued that the diversity of relationships is
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internal cohesion that must be taken into account in order
to understand the behavior of the connected actors
(Gluckman, 1955, p. 19). More recently, Cleaver and others
have argued that in the context of resource management peo-
ple have multiple social identities that go beyond their eco-
nomic and productive roles as “pastoralists” or “irrigators”
(Cleaver, 2002, p. 17; Meinzen-Dick, 2007; Mosse, 1997;
Roth, 2009 and Saunders, 2010). It follows that their actions
are not restricted to economic considerations but encompass
psychological, moral, and social rationales and domains as
well (Cleaver, 2012, p. 15).
Following Gluckman and Cleaver, we show that in small-
scale societies, institutions can hardly regulate one aﬀair with-
out reference to others, since people’s interactions involve
multiple roles and forms. They not only share water but also
food, livestock, ancestries, and other goods and experiences.
This multiplicity of sharing restricts the agency of actors
who cannot separate sharing water from other past or syn-
chronous interactions. At the same time, it oﬀers distinctive
opportunities for monitoring social behavior and controlling
resources.4. DATA
The data analyzed here were collected in northwestern
Namibia by a team of six anthropologists during 2010–14
(M. Bollig, M. Schnegg, Th. Kelbert, D. Menestrey, Th. Linke,
K. Gradt) as part of the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft
(DFG) funded research project LINGS (Local institutions in
globalized societies). The two principle investigators, Bollig
and Schnegg, have conducted ethnographic ﬁeldwork in the
region since 1995 (Bollig) and 2003 (Schnegg) respectively,
and are responsible for the overall design and the comparative
analysis of the data. They supervise three ethnographers
(Menestrey, Linke, Gradt) who stayed for about 15 months
during 2010–11 in the southern, central, and northern parts
of the research area to gain an in-depth understanding of the
process of negotiating and crafting new institutions through
daily routines. Bollig and Schnegg meanwhile continued their
long-term ﬁeldwork. Since the communities are rather small
(between eight and 17 households) we were able to investigate
a total of seven communities in detail.
To explore how the sanctioning, the social fabric, and the
functioning of institutional regimes are related, diﬀerent data
are required: (1) information on whether and which speciﬁc
sanctions exist, (2) information on whether they are applied,
(3) information about the properties of the social network
structure, (4) information on how two and three are linked
and (5) information about what eﬀects that has for the
functioning of institutional regimes. The required data were
gathered in a mixed-method research design through partici-
pant observation, qualitative interviews, and surveys.Table 1. Relationships elicited
Question
1 If anyone in your household needs to organize a
2 If you (your house) need sugar or cooking oil, wh
3 If you (your house) slaughter a goat, to whom do
4 Who is herding your cattle if you and your sons
5 Imagine you are sick. To whom do you commit m
6 With whom do you usually visit to have a chat?
7 If you are in urgent need of cash for paying the w
8 If you notice that the water point (the water infraTo understand whether and how speciﬁc sanctions were
agreed upon we collected documentary evidence. Most com-
munities in the research area have ﬁxed the rules for water
governance in management plans and constitutions. For the
research area, we were able to collect 21 management plans
and constitutions, and will analyze them to show which spe-
ciﬁc institutions and sanctioning mechanisms communities
agreed upon. We further conducted semi-structured interviews
on the institutional design, and investigated the diﬃculties in
applying speciﬁc sanctions (see below). During the long-term
ethnographic ﬁeldwork, we were able to observe the role of
sanctions in day-to-day practices. A combination of question-
ing and observation revealed whether those sanctions were
applied or not.
To identify the most important properties of the social
structure, we conducted structured interviews about the net-
work relationships with all households in each of the seven
communities (Hennig, Brandes, Pfeﬀer, & Mergel, 2012;
Schweizer & White, 1998; Wasserman & Faust, 1994). To
allow for comparability, we selected a core of eight relation-
ships that were the subject of elicitation in all communities
(see Table 1). All interviews (N = 80) were preferably con-
ducted with the household-head (male or female) or, in cases
where the head was part of a couple, with his or her spouse,
or with both members together. We excluded households that
subsist on part-time farming and whose members live and
work in the urban centers while a shepherd stays on the farms.
Although these households are often related to the households
of other farmers, the day-to-day social interactions of their
members cannot be compared with those of household
members living in one place. For the network survey, all
households we approached completed the interview.
The relationships elicited in the network survey are given in
Table 1. 6 The questions we posed corresponded to dimensions
of support addressed in many international social surveys
(e.g., ISSP) and were translated for the regional cultural con-
text. They were intended to capture details of institutional,
economic, emotional, and social support (Freeman & Ruan,
1997; Schweizer, Schnegg, & Berzborn, 1996; Wellman &
Wortley, 1990). The people interviewed were free to name
members of the community and outsiders. The design thus
resembled a personal network approach in which the social
embedding of individuals takes center stage (Hennig et al.,
2012). For the multiplexity analysis we utilized all relation-
ships, both within the communities and with outsiders
(Schweizer et al., 1996; Wellman & Wortley, 1990). For the
density and connectivity analysis we restricted the sample to
the complete network among those interviewed in the seven
communities. Both measures are only deﬁned for complete
networks and were computed for all communities separately,
since they are far apart and do not interlink (Wasserman &
Faust, 1994). The data were coded in a MySQL database
developed for the project.for social network analysis
donkey cart for the following day, whom do you ask for it?
om do you usually ask to give you some?
you send some meat?
are absent or sick?
oney to bring you some medicine from Fransfontein/Otwani/Opuwo?
ater fees, whom do you ask to lend you some money?
structure) has been damaged, whom do you contact ﬁrst?
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ing, and the working of institutions we draw on ethnographic
data. Most of the data were collected in the seven communities
we studied in depth. The research protocol we developed before
starting the ﬁeldwork contained three sections of relevance
here. First, rules of water management. Second, the sanctions
that existed and how they were applied in daily practices.
Third, information about the success of water management,
which also included conﬂicts within and between communities.
We interviewed all adult community members, and most inter-
views were tape-recorded. In addition, ﬁeld notes were taken
after each interview. At the end of the research, for each com-
munity a summary report was entered into the data base which
contained ﬁve large sections and about 100 detailed indicators
about the properties of the community and its ways of govern-
ing water. Those included social relationships, conﬂicts, and
success. The data stored combines information from the
participant observation and interviews and were linked to the
individual, the household, and the community as potential
units of analysis. The coding of the data was done by the prin-
cipal investigators in collaboration with the ﬁeld researchers.
During the analysis we went through the relevant indicators
(e.g., social relationships, conﬂicts, and success) and through
an inductive process identiﬁed the most salient dynamics.
The cases studies were selected to represent those dynamics
and combine diﬀerent sources of information, which we
triangulated to enhance the validity of the analysis. While we
have used a variety of methods to enhance the validity and
the reliability of the analysis, the ethnographic enterprise
remains more subjective than standardized approaches.
As the analysis reveals, the unwillingness to apply speciﬁc
sanctions does not vary between communities, but applies to
all. Hence, there is no variation between the communities to
explain. Our aim is to show why sanctions are not applied,
and why this does not lead to a recurrent breakdown of the
institutional regime. The three cases presented in detail below
were selected from diﬀerent communities to represent dynam-
ics we observed across all of them. The causal relationships we
propose hold true for all communities and do not diﬀerentiate
between them.5. CASE STUDY
Kunene has a low population density (0.8 people/km2) and
most people live a rural life. The pastoral livelihood is
constrained by the environment, most notably the low and
unpredictable precipitation (Bollig, 2006; Schnegg et al.,
2013). Most of the rainfall occurs in summer, between
November and April. Under these ecological constraints, more
than 25–30 ha land are needed to keep one head of cattle
(Burke, 2004). Droughts are frequent in the area and regularly
lead to signiﬁcant loss in livestock.
The social organization in Kunene is largely dominated by
kinship. As noted above, we collected information about the
social networks people maintained in seven communities.
Without going into details yet, one number sets the stage:
654 of the social network ties (N = 776) we identiﬁed were
considered to be kin-based. That is almost 85%. The kinship
system deﬁnes roles through diﬀerent bio-social phenomena:
marriage, generation, seniority within a generation, and gen-
der. Authority and power are typically exercised by men in
interactions with women and by older individuals vis-a`-vis
younger persons.
The economic lives of most people are shaped by their
pastoral livelihood. However, livestock are extremely unevenlydistributed in the research area. As our data show, almost half
of the households own less than 20 head of cattle, while the
most wealthy 8% own more than 200 animals each, and thus
a signiﬁcant portion of the livestock in the area. The uneven
distribution of cattle correlates with other economic indicators
and results in dependencies between those better oﬀ and those
who have less. One form of dependency is that those who have
more lend cattle to poorer households to herd. The herding
households use the milk of these cattle in return for their labor
(northern Kunene). Another form is direct economic transfers,
including food transactions or informal labor contracts,
between rich and poor households (e.g., constructing a cat-
tle-kraal, doing washing). Throughout the research area cattle
and goats are perceived as a reliable source of income, and are
the greatest water consumers.
Naturally occurring water appears in two forms: (1) Springs
that are fed by underground water, and (2) precipitation that
does not enter the ground but ﬂows into seasonal rivers or nat-
urally occurring dams. These sources support only a relatively
low population and livestock density, and are highly unreli-
able. With the establishment of so-called “homelands” during
the Apartheid regime and the politics of segregation the
hydrological perforation changed the landscape drastically.
During 1960–90 the number of boreholes in the northern
region of Kunene increased by a factor of almost ten and
altered the use of the landscape (Bollig, 2013, p. 323). Access
to groundwater opens up pastures even where previously no
open water sources were available.
The technological infrastructure of these boreholes is heter-
ogeneous: diesel engines, wind pumps, hand pumps or electric
motors powered by solar panels are installed to pump up
groundwater. During colonial times and until the 1990s the
entire infrastructure was owned and maintained by the state.
Additionally, the South African colonial administration pro-
vided diesel for those boreholes that operated with engines.
Since the state covered the costs of running and maintaining
the infrastructure, little local coordination was required. There
was thus no need to establish robust institutions at the com-
munity level or to deﬁne complex rules of water management.
This situation drastically changed in the 1990s with the new
water policies.6. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
(a) Speciﬁc sanctions
With the institutional reconﬁgurations that began in the
mid-1990s, the ideas of participation, empowerment, and sus-
tainability through ownership of and engagement with natural
resources entered the stage. The decentralization process in
Namibia was carried out by extension oﬃcers from the regio-
nal authorities (Directorate of Rural Water Supply, DRWS)
and/or NGOs contracted by the government (Bollig &
Menestrey Schwieger, 2014; Falk et al., 2009). During the
process of implementing Community-Based Natural Resource
Management (CBNRM), both the organizational structure
and the institutional arrangements are ﬁxed. At the organiza-
tional level, two bodies are established. The larger of the two is
the Water Point Association (WPA) that usually includes all
adult members of the community. The WPA then appoints a
Water Point Committee (WPC), responsible for the daily con-
cerns of water management.
In addition to the organizational structure, the overall
principles and rules of water management are ﬁxed in two doc-
uments: the “constitution” and the “management plan.” Both
Table 2. Sanctions deﬁned in the management plans (N = 21)
Rules Rule explicitly stated
in management plan
n, (%)
Sanction explicitly
stated in management
plan n, (%)
Children are not allowed (to play or waste water) at the WP 13 (61.9) 5 (38.5)
Water point gates must be kept closed when not in use/users must adhere to opening hours 17 (80.9) 11 (64.7)
Taps must be closed after every use 12 (57.1) 8 (66.7)
No one is allowed to wash him- or herself/ swim at the WP/in the trough 17 (80.9) 14 (82.3)
Water point yard should not be used to catch/keep livestock 5 (23.8) 3 (60)
The water point must be cleaned regularly 12 (57.1) 9 (75)
WP may not be used without permission 3 (14.3) 3 (100)
All members must contribute water fees 21 (100) 21 (100)
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nity meetings which are supervised by the extension oﬃcers.
The decentralization process has several steps. By this point,
all communities have already entered the “operation and
maintenance” phase. Farmers thus have the authority to
develop and enforce their own rules (including the possibility
of denying households access to water), the responsibility for
organizing the payments for diesel, and for maintaining the
bulk of the infrastructure above ground.
Table 2 lists the most common rules ﬁxed in the manage-
ment plans, and whether sanctions ought to be applied if they
are broken. The table gives the number of communities that
agreed upon the rule in the second column (out of the total
of 21 communities for which we have information). The third
column shows in what percentage of those cases a sanction is
speciﬁed within the management plan.
The diﬀerent regulations and sanctions mentioned in the
management plan can roughly be categorized into two subject
areas: ﬁrst, in case community members do not pay their con-
tributions, and second, in case the water point is not handled
properly. The latter subject encompasses restrictive rules,
including (1) that children should not play at the water point,
(2) that washing is not permitted, and (3) that the water tap
should be turned oﬀ after use. In more than 60% of cases, vio-
lations of such handling rules are sanctioned with a ﬁne. Those
ﬁnes range from 10 NAD for leaving the gates open up to 100
NAD for bathing at the water point, and can sometimes be
diﬀerent for community members and outside users. If com-
munity members refuse to pay contributions – a conﬂictive
issue in all of the communities we studied – graduated sanc-
tions are listed in all documents. The starting point is usually
the possibility of substituting cash contributions for labor
sharing (85.7%) or oral admonishment by the WPC or other
local authorities, up to a temporary or permanent exclusion
from the water point as a penalty of last resort (71.4%). Some
communities state explicitly that they would enforce exclusion
with the help of the police.
As Table 2 reveals, the communities have spent considerable
eﬀort to come up with norms for regulating water and speciﬁc
sanctions for violations. However, although the management
plans provide detailed guidelines for how to enforce the rules,
the application of sanctions is seldom observed in the day-to-
day water management of community members. Although
rules are broken now and then, during the entire year of ﬁeld-
work in seven communities we witnessed only a single case in
which a ﬁne was paid for breaking a “handling rule.” Regard-
ing contributions, bending the rules – e.g., failing to pay on
time – is in fact a common practice. Again, violating the rules
was seldom punished and in no case was a user excluded from
access to the water point. Since deviations are most obvious
with respect to payments, our ethnographic examples will
focus on these issues.(b) Social networks
Our brief ethnographic descriptions have already revealed
that communities are small and economically heterogeneous
and that people share more than water: They are kith and
kin, use the same land for grazing, help each other in everyday
life, and thus are related in many diﬀerent ways. Network
analysis allows us to describe the properties of the emergent
social structure in the seven communities more precisely.
One of the most salient characteristics of networks is their
density. Network density is deﬁned as the proportion of ties
realized in relation to those possible (Hennig et al., 2012;
Wasserman and Faust, 1994, p. 118). The networks in the
seven communities we studied show a comparably high den-
sity value (Schnegg, 2006). On average about 30% of all possi-
ble ties along the dimensions we studied are indeed realized. 7
While density informs us that the communities interact
intensely, it does not provide information about the structur-
ing of the ties among members. Connectivity is a measure of
social cohesion that looks beyond the mere quantity of rela-
tionships and takes their patterning into account. Connectivity
of a group is given if all members of the group are linked
through some path, that is, if they are all connected (Hennig
et al., 2012, p. 132; Moody & White, 2003). In ﬁve of the seven
communities all members are connected and form one social
system. In the remaining two, the numbers are still above
80%, and they become fully connected (i.e., 100%) if we take
into account two other relationships that were not asked
about in all the communities. The analysis reveals that most
households can reach one another directly. There are no iso-
lates. This indicates a high degree of connectivity and social
cohesion.
So far, the analysis allows us to conclude that the social fab-
ric of all seven communities is dense and that they are well
connected. According to the literature, possession of both
characteristics should make it easier to build and maintain
successful institutions. Connectivity and density allow for
communication in day-to-day interactions and a high ﬂow of
information. Both help to develop trust and shared norms
(Janssen, 2013; Janssen & Ostrom, 2014; Ostrom, 1990, p.
206; Poteete et al., 2010, p. 227).
In our theoretical discussion, we have already indicated that
density and cohesion are not suﬃcient to understand the social
dynamics in our cases. We have put strong emphasis on the
overlap of diﬀerent social ties and ﬁelds of sharing (multiplex-
ity) and the ways in which this structures institutional develop-
ments. Multiplexity can be measured by examining the
number of diﬀerent contexts encompassed within a dyad of
two people (Haythornthwaite, 2001; Schweizer et al., 1996;
Verbrugge, 1979). If two actors interact in only one way, let
us say by helping each other with herding, their social circles
overlap little. In this case, the multiplexity of the relationships
Table 3. Multiplexity of all relationships (N = 776)
Multiplexity Number
of ties
% of ties % of ties with
multiplexity higher than
Multiplexity 1 61 7.9 92.1
Multiplexity 2 324 41.8 50.3
Multiplexity 3 169 21.8 28.5
Multiplexity 4 89 11.5 17
Multiplexity 5 63 8.1 8.9
Multiplexity 6 50 6.4 2.5
Multiplexity 7 14 1.8 0.7
Multiplexity 8 5 .6 0.1
Multiplexity 9 1 .1 0
Sum 776 100 100
210 WORLD DEVELOPMENTis one. If, however, both are also kin and borrow money from
each other, their social circles overlap to a larger degree.
Again, we can count the number of diﬀerent bases for their
interactions, and their multiplexity is deﬁned to be three.
Table 3 shows the multiplexity of ties across the seven com-
munities in which we did extensive ethnographic ﬁeldwork.
Any of the 776 relationships observed could entail a maximum
of nine diﬀerent transactions 8 and a minimum of one. As we
see in Table 3, almost 90% of the relationships contain more
than one transaction and are thus multiplex. More than 50%
of the relationships contain two or more transactions, indicat-
ing the high degree of network multiplexity. This constitutes a
speciﬁc social structure, and it is highly unlikely that interac-
tions among water-users only take into account rules and
sanctions speciﬁcally regulating this resource. In contrast, (1)
norms and codes of behavior that structure diﬀerent social
relations are likely to be blurred, and (2) further resource-
ﬂows that take place within the multiplex social settings are
likely to impact conduct with regard to water (Cleaver, 2012).
We have hypothesized that the social structure and the fact
that people share a great many resources in dense networks is
essential for understanding why formal sanctions are not
applied in water management in northwestern Namibia. The
social processes that may hinder formal sanctioning are exam-
ined next. However, and as we show, networks are double-
edged: The same networks not only prevent sanctioning but
also oﬀer other ways to exercise social control and enforce
norm conformity, and hence regulate behavior.
(c) Preventing the implementation of speciﬁc sanctions
Density and multiplexity constitute a speciﬁc social fabric
with far-reaching consequences for building and maintaining
institutions. The case study of the wealthy cattle-owner Alfons
and his nephew Justus – introduced in the opening paragraph
– indicates that people ﬁnd it very hard to impose the formal
sanctions. When we asked Justus why they did not punish his
uncle he replied 9:
JUSTUS: We have tried that also, together with the secre-
tary and the treasurer. (. . .) But, if you look closely, then it
is mostly family on the farm.
MICHAEL: Is it easier to work together in a family or
when you are not related?
JUSTUS: When it’s just one family, then it is very diﬃcult.
It must at least be two diﬀerent families.
MICHAEL: But why is it more diﬃcult if it’s one family?
JUSTUS: Then it is diﬃcult to directly approach the person
and tell them their punishment.
MICHAEL: But why can you not go?JUSTUS: Maybe it’s having sympathy for your family that
causes the problem, because you cannot face them. Some-
times it is also respect, like with me and my uncle.
Justus makes it clear that the dense kinship network and the
kinship relationship he has with his uncle makes it impossible
for him to enforce sanctions against Alfons. In the cultural con-
text, kinship, generations, and gender structure social interac-
tions to a large degree. Among all kinship ties, that between
a nephew and his uncle (mother’s brother) is one of the most
salient. A man will inherit property (especially cattle) from
his maternal uncle, and is supposed to be subordinate, helpful,
and respectful to him. The speciﬁc relationship of Alfons and
Justus, however, diﬀers, at least formally, in the context of
sharing water. Here the management plan deﬁnes them as hav-
ing a horizontal relationship, as co-users of a shared water
point, or even one of superiority between Justus as the chair-
person and his uncle Alfons as an ordinary community-mem-
ber. However, the norms associated with their kinship roles
overrule the relationships deﬁned on paper for sharing water.
As Justus put it: “They (people like Alfons) know exactly that
you will never ever face them. Because some people are big,
some people are, you see, respected. You cannot go and force
someone like Alfons.” Restrictive measures, like asking his
uncle to do extra work, or imposing a ﬁne on him, or even
excluding him from the borehole, are highly inappropriate
and would be judged – not only by Alfons, but by the entire
community – as an oﬀense hence leading to a severe conﬂict.
The multiplexity of the relationship between the two men is
at least three (kinship, sharing water, sharing food) and Justus
cannot separate one from the other in any speciﬁc social situa-
tion. In all cases, however, the most salient relationship is that
of kinship and its normative conduct, which dominates and
prevents the sanctioning of a respected man by his sister’s son.
At the same time Alfons is part of the community and
related to many people. His reputation is also based on their
valuations, and a person who does not give, even though
everyone knows (and can see) that s/he has something to
share, is not regarded as wise, and hence will not be respected.
In this context, public talk and gossip become one way to mus-
ter social pressure. People in Elandsput complained about
Alfons on many occasions and put him and his family in the
position of having to justify his behavior. On one occasion
he defended himself, arguing that even though he did not con-
tribute to buying diesel he had given a larger-than-propor-
tional sum toward the construction of the community kraal
they had recently built. Alfons has not, and still does not con-
tribute his ﬁnancial share to the water point. Our case study
exempliﬁes the importance of both social hierarchy and status,
which oﬀer an opportunity to avoid complying with certain
rules. Even though the community musters social pressure,
they are not able to force Alfons to pay his share of the cost
of diesel for the water pump. At the same time, there is a cer-
tain limit to his hubris, and his defensive justiﬁcation indicates
his sense (apparently at least reluctantly accepted by others)
that he has contributed in other social realms suﬃciently to
maintain his shared community rights.
(d) Adjusting speciﬁc sanctions
Unlike Alfons, many people in the communities cannot pay
at the time payments are due or when diesel is required
because they do not have cash at hand. According to the rules,
they should be sanctioned. Yet, as with Alfons, this does not
happen. Imanuel Amtana, an elderly respected person and
headman of the Kleinrivier community, explained why. 10
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contributions – we heard it is not so easy to collect the
diesel?
IMANUEL: Actually it’s not a big issue to talk about. Peo-
ple are like this when it comes to money. Some give and
some don’t. Some do not have anything to give. Then we
discuss it. Still some people do not want to contribute.
But it is not such a big problem.
THERESA: But if people do not want to contribute you
will have to deal with this problem?
IMANUEL: There are rules in case you do not contribute.
THERESA: What rules?
IMANUEL: Your animals do not drink at the water-
point. . .
THERESA: But did this ever happen?
IMANUEL: No, it never happens. Actually even if you do
not pay for several months you are not going to be forced
in any way. Because you are going to give! [. . .] The day you
will get something you will have to give! [. . .] This is how I
feel. If the person does not have, leave him alone! The next
day he is going to have.
THERESA: So this is the way it works?
IMANUEL: You are not going to be threatened if you
don’t have (suﬃcient resources to pay your share). But
you must take care that tomorrow you help the person
who helped you before.
THERESA: You must support the ones who supported
you?
IMANUEL: Exactly.
When asked about the ways they deal with people who do not
contribute, Imanuel underlines that they have never applied
formal sanctioning – that is, issued a ﬁne. However, the situa-
tion he refers to is diﬀerent from the one between Alfons and
Justus. Here, a person does not have the ﬁnancial resources
to contribute as called upon. Imanuel uses a diﬀerent strategy
to integrate poorer households into the cooperative manage-
ment of water. Imposing ﬁnes on them or even excluding them
from the use of water would further exacerbate their economic
situation. Instead, Imanuel trusts in long-term cooperation and
reciprocity. At some time, even the poorest community mem-
bers will have a surplus and then they must give. He knows that
the close communication and information network of the com-
munity will spread the word when one of the households sells a
goat or gets access to cash through sporadic wage labor. That
day, he will be there to remind them about their outstanding
dues. Then, it will be very diﬃcult if not impossible to refuse.
Again, and as in the previous case, the multiplexity of the
relationship is high. Imanuel and most of the community mem-
bers he refers to share food, work, land and experiences. In
addition, they expect to share a future. In this situation even
if one could impose a ﬁne the social cost would be high. Imman-
uel knows some households are poor. Fining them would pro-
duce conﬂict and social damage both immediately and in the
future, while providing leeway insures later participation.
Both cases reveal vividly that people are aware that they inter-
act inmore than one way and that this prevents the imposition of
formal sanctions. At the same time both cases also indicate that
social networks openother channels of control:Gossip in the case
of Alfons, and in the second case, knowledge about the truth of a
household’s claim to at least temporary impoverishment.
(e) Substituting speciﬁc sanctions
The ineﬃcacy of institutional sanctioning does not lead to
failure of natural resource management, as anticipated byinstitutional theory. As we have already indicated, social cohe-
sion and a multiplexity of ties oﬀer other ways to control com-
munity members. These go beyond monitoring in the sense of
obtaining information about the strategies and behaviors of
other community members (Ostrom, 1990, p. 95). As the case
of Alfons revealed, social cohesion also implies shared knowl-
edge about social positioning, and public discourse and gossip
can challenge reputations associated with valued standing in a
community. Alfons has something to lose, and will be sensitive
to how far he can go in not cooperating. At the same time he is
economically independent and enjoys relative autonomy,
which makes it diﬃcult to force him to follow the rules in
any particular instance. Furthermore, as in the case of Imanuel,
the exchange of information in the community provides knowl-
edge about relative wealth – who has something to give – and
thereby allows the behavior of others to be contextualized. This
becomes even more eﬀective if multiplexity and dependencies
between the parties increase, as the following case reveals.
Karel is a head of household in his forties who returned a
few years ago from Windhoek, where he worked as a laborer,
to start farming and to take care of his sick father. 11 Soon,
economic fortunes turned against him and he was left with
no livestock except a few donkeys when we met. During our
ﬁeldwork, Karel was pursuing diﬀerent sorts of casual work
to earn money and to support his girlfriend and their two chil-
dren. During the dry season the community was about to run
out of diesel. According to the books, Karel had not provided
any diesel for more than a year. Again, he had never been for-
mally sanctioned or ﬁned for not contributing. When this
became public in the situation of water scarcity, Albertina, a
pensioner who contributes more often and is owner of the
largest herd of cattle in the community, became angry.
Given high economic insecurity and the absence of markets,
people often lack basic food items. One day there is no maize
meal, the next day no tea or, even worse, sugar (one of the
most important sources of calories for a large part of the pop-
ulation). When in need, people visit one another and demand a
fair share from their neighbors. This is common practice,
widely accepted, and the demands are rarely refused. Demand
sharing constitutes a salient part of the social order of many
rural Namibian communities (Widlok, 2013).
Karel found himself in need of sugar shortly after refusing
to pay the contribution for diesel. He went over to Albertina’s
house, just as he had dozens times before. However, this time
things went diﬀerently. When he demanded a cup of sugar,
Albertina told him straight to his face that this was not how
sharing worked. She told him that he knew well about the
water shortage and that the time had come to pay for the
water he was using. Karel defended himself, pointing out that
he possesses neither goats nor cattle, let alone cash to buy die-
sel. Albertina did not back down, and proposed that his sister,
who works as a police oﬃcer in Windhoek and has a regular
income, could help by enabling him to buy at least 5 L of die-
sel. She began spreading the admonition in the village and the
matter soon became a public debate. Due to her social stand-
ing within the community, she was able to show her anger
openly and to take a strong negotiating position. In his inse-
cure economic situation, Karel was highly dependent on coop-
eration and sharing with other households who, like
Albertina, now and then helped him with staple food and
milk. It was this dependency and the fear of losing his social
support network that made him go to Fransfontein the next
day. When he returned, he brought 5 L of diesel, purchased
with the money his sister had provided.
Unlike Imanuel, who reﬂected about the ways things are
done generally, Albertina did not want to wait in this speciﬁc
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year, and she did not envision that he would do so in the near
future. The case shows how the publicity of a socially accepted
claim and dependency on other relations of sharing allows the
community to create pressure and to enforce a rule. Albertina
not only knew that Karel had not paid, but also knew that his
sister had cash and would help him out. Both pieces of infor-
mation, spread through dense networks, allowed her to create
social pressure. It is the intertwined dependency relations
among people in the community that maintains such pressure.
Even without sanctioning, the fear and the threat that one may
be excluded from the wider ﬁeld of sharing prompted Karel to
comply. Karel regarded his payment as unfair, but neverthe-
less he could not escape the claim. Although his household
was not excluded from water, the potential threat of exclusion
from other ﬁelds of sharing is equally, if not more, eﬀective.
We began with the case of Justus and his uncle Alfons.
Alfons did not follow the rules and his nephew could not sanc-
tion him formally. At the same time, the means to create social
pressure against a relatively autonomous person are limited.
In this case Justus and Alfons navigate between exercising
their own power through rule-breaking and conceding to the
power of gossip to challenge the social status and standing
of a community member. The second discussion, and the fur-
ther case of Imanuel, reveal a diﬀerent kind of balance for
those without adequate funds to support the water supply.
In principle long-term reciprocity prevails. However, with
Karel, the case was diﬀerent. He broke the same rules that oth-
ers in dire ﬁnancial straits had broken, and like those others,
was not punished for some time. However, at a moment of
water-shortage, when he had not paid for more than a year,
Albertina wanted him to prove his willingness to share. His
social and economic dependency was such that the threat of
exclusion from networks of sharing was too severe for him
to withstand. Even though not sanctioned speciﬁcally within
the domain of water supply, the social pressure among his
community networks became unbearable and he changed his
behavior to comply.7. CONCLUSION
We started this article with the observation that speciﬁc
sanctions, spelled out in detail in management plans, are
almost never applied in northwestern Namibia, and yet this
does not lead to a recurrent breakdown of the institutional
regime and water supply. In search of an explanation, we
pointed to the importance of social networks and the role they
play in explaining both phenomena.
A look at the literature reveals that CPR theory largely
focuses on the ability of networks to provide information
and to facilitate communication in regular face-to-face inter-
actions; this in turn allows low-cost monitoring and sanction-
ing and reinforces shared rules as well as norms of behavior.
Brieﬂy, the more dense and cohesive a social network, the eas-
ier it becomes to achieve collective action. While this view is
supported by most studies, some have indicated that social
capital (measured in terms of social networks at the commu-
nity level) hinders sanctioning (Bodin & Crona, 2008). WhileBodin and Crona (2008) relate network properties, sanction-
ing and the functioning of institutions at the aggregate level,
they do not provide a detailed account of how such a causal
relationship might work.
In this article, we applied a mixed-methods research strategy
to do just that. Network analysis and the concepts of connec-
tivity, density, and multiplexity allow us to describe the social
structure in the pastoral communities we studied. The analysis
has revealed that they are both dense and connected, thus dis-
playing social structures favorable to achieving successful
resource governance. However, they are also multiplex. This
forms a speciﬁc social context for establishing and enforcing
rules of water management. Here, water becomes just one of
many social ﬁelds of sharing, and its management is embedded
in past, co-occurring, and projected future interactions.
This multiplexity of social conﬁguration has signiﬁcant con-
sequences for individuals’ conduct regarding water, as the
qualitative ethnographic analysis reveals. People ﬁnd it diﬃ-
cult to refer to water as a separate domain, and kinship roles
especially circumscribe how people interact with one another
in this area, as well as others. While kinship ties lend power
to some, they restrict the agency of others. Especially for
younger people it is virtually impossible to sanction elder rel-
atives. Even though the networks are dense, this speciﬁc con-
ﬁguration, which is likely to be found in many comparable
communities, hinders the application of sanctions.
However, and in contrast to the case discussed by Bodin and
Crona (2008) the inability to execute formal sanctioning does
not lead to recurrent breakdowns in access to water; nor does
it result in a complete neglect of the infrastructure. Water
shortage due to lack of diesel is rare. While social embedded-
ness prevents formal sanctioning it enables other modes of
social control through processes of adjustment and substitu-
tion. Dense and multiplex relations allow a rapid spread of
information and provide detailed knowledge about the social
and economic situations of community members, which allows
others to contextualize their behavior, and their breaking or
bending of the rules. Here, communication and information
itself become means of social control. In addition, multiplex
relations combine diﬀerent spheres of sharing. For most
households the threat of isolation from a larger network or
community sphere is more signiﬁcant than any gain that might
result from the violation of a rule. This oﬀers the possibility of
using social pressure to encourage cooperation and exploits
the fear of exclusion and the withdrawal of support to urge
conformity.
In sum, the case studies indicate that social networks hinder
formal sanctioning and at the same time adjust and substitute
enforcement rules. Since they are substituted, institutions
work and water is provided. It is diﬃcult to say whether the
causal relationships observed here will also hold true for the
management of other common-pool resources, like pastures,
forests or ﬁsheries. From what we observe, we would assume
that under similarly high levels of density, connectedness
and multiplexity it will always be challenging to execute spe-
ciﬁc sanctions in small face-to-face communities. Whether
and when those social networks provide alternative means to
govern resources successfully is left to further exploration
and debate (Bodin & Crona, 2008).NOTES1. Personal and community names are pseudonyms.
2. This encounter took place during ﬁeld research conducted by MS in
2014.3. To grasp the enforcement of rules described here and to distinguish
them from other forms of control, we use the term “speciﬁc sanctions”.
Speciﬁc sanctions are related to one domain of interaction (e.g., water)
and agreed upon between appropriators of a common-pool resource.
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and collective goods. Exclusion, in our case, is practically impossible
because the animals come to the water point en masse and are too strong
to be controlled by their owners. In addition, pastures and water points
within communal lands are rarely fenced.5. Furthermore, integration is likely to inﬂuence the way an actor
perceives the future. Those who have been integrated into a speciﬁc place
over generations are likely to have more interest in protecting the
resources, and thus to value future costs diﬀerently than their neighbors
who have many external opportunities and are “on the jump.”6. This analysis takes into account only the relationships that were
elicited in all seven communities to make results comparable.7. The density values vary among communities and correlate with their
size. A correlation between density and size is often observed for social
networks. It can be explained by the fact that the number of relationships
an individual can maintain is limited, and the larger a network gets the
more diﬃcult it becomes for each member to maintain ties to, let us say,
80% of the rest.
8. The eight questions asked (Table 1) plus kinship as a ninth tie.
9. Interview MS, 25.03.2014.
10. Interview TL, 20.10.2011.
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